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MARB URY V. MADISON AND MODERN
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Robert F. Nagel*

This Article compares the realist critique of Marbury with
several revisionist defenses of that decision. Realists claim to
see Marbury as essentially political and thus as the
fountainhead of modern judicial review. Revisionists claim to
see the decision as legalisticallyjustified and thus inconsistent
with current practices. Close examination, however, indicates
that, despite sharp rhetorical differences, these two accounts
are largely complementary rather than inconsistent. Each
envisions Marbury as embodying elements of both political
realism and legal formalism. Once the false argument about
whether Marbury was eitherpolitical or legal is put aside, it is
possible to trace the influence of the decision on contemporary
judicial behavior in a fuller way because that influence is the
consequence of the interaction between these two aspects of the
case.

I.

INTRODUCTION

What is the relationship between Marbury v. Madison' and the
modern practice of judicial review? The dominant view, at least in
2
academic circles, has rested upon a critical reading of the case.
This view is skeptical of the more legalistic arguments in Marbury
and emphasizes institutional or even political explanations for the
decision. Perversely enough, this critique can actually work to
legitimize the contemporary Court's use of power. It is, so to speak,
as if jurisprudential explorers had discovered that it is realism all

* Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr., Professor of Constitutional Law, University of
Colorado School of Law. The Author is grateful for comments from Richard
Collins, Paul Campos, Steven D. Smith, and participants in a faculty
colloquium at the University of San Diego Law School, and also for research
assistance from Jessica Chavez.
1. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. See generally ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON,
JUDucIAL REVIEW 6 (1989).
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the way down.3 If even the talismanic Marbury v. Madison can be
shown to be political, then the legalistic deficiencies of modern
decisions may not seem so unacceptable. (There never was, you see,
anything else but political interpretation.) Because the dominant
view largely conceives of Marbury as an assertion of power, and
because in this and other respects it does not depict Marbury as
fundamentally different from modern decisions, the realist critique
rests comfortably with the historical claim that contemporary
practices grew directly out of Marbury itself.
In recent years, the dominant view has been challenged by a
number of important writers who have, in different ways, claimed
that the realistic criticisms of Marbury are overblown, that the
decision is more limited and more justifiable (according to formalist
criteria) than those criticisms acknowledge. 4 The revisionist view
can work to de-legitimize contemporary practices because it offers
up the source of the doctrine of judicial review as proof of the
possibility of the kind of legalistically disciplined use of judicial
power that modern practices are thought to lack. Moreover, to the
extent that Marbury stands as a kind of reproach to current
practices, the claim that those practices are directly or fully
traceable to Marbury is undermined. Consequently, revisionists
search for intervening jurisprudential or historical factors that
might explain how the tame institution that was created by Justice
Marshall could have changed into the beast that roams the land
today.
In this Article, I propose a third possibility, a possibility that
may seem rather obvious but which has not (as far as I know) been
developed very explicitly or systematically. The third possibility is
that both the realists and the revisionists are partly right. It follows
from this position that Marbury does not especially legitimize
modern practices because, while aspects of the decision presaged the
politicized role of the modem judiciary, as a whole, the case
certainly does not demonstrate that significant legalistic discipline
is impossible or undesirable. It also follows that Marbury does not
especially de-legitimize modem practices because it does not
demonstrate that the complete exclusion of personal or political
considerations from constitutional interpretation is possible or
desirable. More importantly for my purposes, the third view of
Marbury suggests that it might be precisely the interaction between
the realistic and formalistic elements of the decision that has
resonated so powerfully with American political culture and is,
therefore, at least indirectly responsible for the scope and nature of
3. See id. at 192-93.
4. See id. at 6-7.
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modem judicial review.
II.

THE REALIST CRITIQUE

The realist critique of Marbury is familiar; indeed, it is almost
foundational to most courses in constitutional law. Originally
developed and expounded by eminent legal writers such as Learned
Hand, Robert G. McCloskey, and Alexander Bickel, important
elements of the critique are passed on in widely used case books.
Perhaps the most complete and influential single statement is
William W. Van Alstyne's A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison,
published5 in 1969 as a "compendium" of the existing scholarly
criticism.
Van Alstyne begins by explicitly connecting Marbury with two
distinctly modernistic assumptions about judicial review-the claim
of judicial supremacy and the claim that the Constitution "is" what
judges say it is.6 He proceeds to put the case in historical and
political context, noting, for example, Marshall's political biases and
his role in the events giving rise to the lawsuit itself.7 There follows
a systematic criticism of virtually every aspect of Marshall's opinion:
the willingness to address politically sensitive issues over which (the
opinion later acknowledges) the Court had no jurisdiction; the
questionable conclusion that Marbury had a statutory right to the
commission and the failure to address the constitutional question as
to whether Congress had authority to limit the President's removal
authority over a non-Article III judge; the potentially expansive
treatment of the issue of sovereign immunity; the Court's dubious
interpretation of Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as
conferring original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court; and every
argument-whether based on the nature of written constitutions,
generally or, on the structure or logic or text of this specific
Constitution-for the power of judicial review.8 Van Alstyne does
not specifically treat the question of original intent regarding
judicial review because the Court itself did not rely on historical
materials, but he does add a selection of excerpts from historical
materials that tend to demonstrate, as do virtually all of his
criticisms of the opinion itself, that the Constitution was, in fact,
indeterminate on the issues decided in Marbury.9
Van Alstyne's criticisms are sufficiently strong and complete
5. William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969
DuKE L.J. 1, 3.

6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

2.
8.
9-33.
38-45.
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that a reader might easily slide to the cynical conclusion, mentioned
by Van Alstyne at the outset, that the Court has the power of
judicial review only because the justices said so. And I suspect that
generations of law students have in fact taken away the lesson that
it is realism-politics and will-all the way down to the source of the
modern practice of judicial review. But this extreme, modern
understanding of Marbury is, in part, what Van Alstyne intended to
debunk. His student editors, at least, understood his purpose to be
to assist them to make judgments about the proper use of judicial
power in current controversies by a "reexamination of the concept of
judicial review at its source."1 This implies, of course, that there
are better and worse understandings of Marbury and better and
worse ways to exercise judicial review. And, indeed, Van Alstyne's
analysis leads him to conclude that the reasoning in Marbury does
not entail the modern doctrine of judicial supremacy 1 -the other
modern understanding of Marbury referred to at the outset of his
article.
Indeed, Van Alstyne appears to have hoped that his
analysis would undermine not only the doctrine of judicial
supremacy but also uncritical reliance on judicial review more
generally. For instance, he advances the possibility that, given the
facts of Marbury and given the principle of separation of powers, the
decision should be understood to establish judicial review only for
statutes impinging on the judicial power."
The difficulty with using Marbury as a benchmark for assessing
the modern use of judicial power is that the bulk of Van Alstyne's
argument tends to demonstrate that nothing legally authoritative
required any of the Court's conclusions in Marbury. When combined
with the historical background provided by Van Alstyne, this
critique is easily misunderstood as an argument that the personal
and the political are all that stand behind the Court's decision. But,
of course, to say that legal arguments did not require the result in
Marbury is not to say that none helped to support the result, just as
recognizing that political context might have influenced the decision
is not to insist that it was the only influence. It is quite plain that
Van Alstyne intended to undermine not only the modern linkage
between Marbury and judicial supremacy but also the cynical
conclusion that Marbury demonstrates that the Constitution means
only what the Court declares it to mean. While often depicted as a
radical attack, his famous article, in fact, combines moderate
realism with conventional legal argument in an effort to encourage
continuing debate about what kind of judicial review is authorized
10. Id. at 1.
11. Id. at 34-37.
12. Id. at 34.
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by the Constitution.

III. THE REVISIONIST DEFENSE
The revisionist defense of Marbury began in earnest in 1986
with the appearance of Christopher Wolfe's book, The Rise of
Modern Judicial Review. 31 For Wolfe, Marbury is not the primary
source of modem judicial review.14 For one thing, that case was not
a self-contained intellectual effort; it reflected widespread
understandings about the nature of the judicial function and of
constitutionalism as expressed in other cases and in non-judicial
sources like The Federalist Number 78.15 For another, modem
judicial review is a starkly different enterprise from what was
authorized by Marbury. According to Wolfe, the former consists in
self-conscious acts of judicial creativity ("will") while the latter, as
practiced by Chief Justice Marshall, consisted in good-faith,
conscientious efforts to interpret the Constitution as a legal
document ("judgment").16 Consequently, the sources of modern
judicial review must be sought in historical and intellectual trends
quite extrinsic (and even antithetical) to Marbury. Thus, Wolfe
suggests that the judicial function gradually changed because of a
natural urge among judges to amass power and to express their
idealism, because of a widening gulf between the values common in
the legal profession and those common in the general population,
and because of the triumph of legal realism."
Although Wolfe's distinction between traditional and modem
forms of judicial review may sound naive to some, it is not. Indeed,
his account of Justice Marshall's understanding of the nature of
legal interpretation is sophisticated. It is neither literalistic nor
woodenly historicist. Instead, Wolfe claims that during the
traditional period there was widespread agreement that specific
words had to be understood in their context, including the purposes
and nature of the whole instrument within which they appeared. 8
Moreover, he repeatedly acknowledges that agreement about
interpretive rules does not assure agreement about interpretive
outcomes, even on fundamental issues.' 9 In Wolfe's view, the value
of traditional legal interpretation is not that it produces determinate

13.

CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

110-13.
73-79.
3-4, passim.
8-10.
41-44.
25, 31, 61-62.

(1986).
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results, but that it "narrow[s] the range of differences . . . and
provide[s] a common standard for deciding issues."20 In the end,
Wolfe's contrast between traditional and modern interpretation has
as much to do with attitude and effort as with constraint and
determinacy. The traditional judge intended in good faith to
interpret the document and believed this to be possible.2 The
modern judge intends to "legislate" (to impose his or her own
preferences), rather than to find the meaning of the document.2
Wolfe acknowledges, however, that this difference does not mean
that the traditional judge's view of constitutional meaning was
wholly independent of his political preferences.23 Judgments about
the political theory embedded in the Constitution could, for instance,
reflect both the personal philosophy of a traditional judge and actual
constitutional principles.
The traditional judge might, then,
sometimes have given effect to his own views but (at least ideally)
only when they coincided with correct constitutional meaning.
How certain, when personal preferences were confounded with
abstract constitutional meaning, could a traditional judge be about
having accurately identified that meaning? Wolfe's phrasing is
careful. He says that "strong" arguments could be made about the
correct content of constitutional principles and that knowledge of
such principles was a "valuable aid" in interpretation.24 In short, for
the traditional judge, law and politics were not entirely separate,
but accurate constitutional interpretation was nevertheless possible
because some legal arguments, while not altogether conclusive, were
simply stronger than others. Thus, despite the sharp rhetorical
divide that he draws between the modern practice of judicial
legislation and the traditional practice of objective interpretation,
Wolfe in fact provides an account of traditional judging that in
significant measure is compatible with realistic accounts.
Therefore, when Wolfe turns to rehabilitating Marbury v.
Madison, his claims are modest and in many ways not inconsistent
with Van Alstyne's critique. For example, on the charge that
Marshall should have recused himself from the case, Wolfe quotes
Thayer to the effect that the Chief Justice "was sometimes curiously
regardless of conventions."'' This, of course, is more a description
than a defense, and Wolfe adds to it only some mild speculations
about possible high-minded motivations that might, in fact, be fairly

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

37.
323-24.
221, 240, 245, 325-26.
61-62, 86-88.
61-63.
85.
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described as involving political as much as legal considerations.
On Marshall's interpretation of the Judiciary Act, as providing
for original mandamus jurisdiction, Wolfe provides a textual defense
but does not deny Van Alstyne's contention that the text would
allow the opposite conclusion.2 6 Indeed, Wolfe does not even deny
that Marshall might have been motivated to construe the Judiciary
Act as he did because this would allow him to "establish[ ] the power
of judicial review" in a politically palatable circumstance.27 Indeed,
Wolfe goes on to describe precisely the same political setting that
the realist critique emphasizes and simply characterizes Marshall's
motivations in that setting as high-mindedly institutional (or, in
Wolfe's term, "constitutional"), rather than partisan.8 But Wolfe's
own analysis demonstrates that these high-minded purposes, such
as avoiding presidential nonenforcement of a mandamus order,
cannot be entirely separated from partisan purposes, since the order
would have issued from a judiciary controlled by partisan
Federalists and would have been resisted by a highly partisan
Republican president. To say that an "opinion simply denying
jurisdiction would.., have detracted from the public position of a
judicial branch that had not yet thoroughly established its
respectability or power"2 is, as Wolfe comes close to acknowledging,
to supplement, rather than to deny, the charges of institutional selfaggrandizement and partisanship. °
On the issue of judicial review itself, Wolfe's analysis is also
surprisingly consistent with Van Alstyne's. While Wolfe argues that
a power of judicial review is "the most reasonable interpretation of
the Constitution,"3 ' he does not think that any of the arguments
against it can "be dismissed as wrong. 3 2 In fact, Wolfe is expanding
on one of Van Alstyne's basic arguments when he writes:
There is no necessary problem with judges giving effect to
unconstitutional laws, any more than with presidents
enforcing unconstitutional laws passed over their vetos. In
both cases, they are not responsible for the unconstitutionality
per se-the blame for that belongs to the legislature. One can
easily imagine a polity in which judges and executives were
not permitted to consider whether laws violated the
Constitution, but simply took the laws as they were given, and

26. Id. at 85-86.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 86-87.
Id. at 87.
Id.
See id. at 88.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 89.
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enforced them.33

Judicial review, then, is not a necessary logical inference from
the nature of a written constitution. Indeed, for Wolfe, it is the best
interpretation of our Constitution only if the practice is strictly
limited in ways that are consistent with the larger institutional
principles that animate his argument. Specifically, he (like Van
Alstyne34) rejects the doctrine of judicial supremacy and adds other
limitations, like the political question doctrine, that arise from the
principle of separation of powers that Wolfe argues reinforces fair
inferences from the text of the Constitution.5
It is, as I have argued, entirely consistent with the purpose and
content of Van Alstyne's realist critique to believe that some limited
form of judicial review is the best interpretation of the Constitution,
at least if the arguments advanced in Marbury are supplemented by
arguments about the theory that underlies our form of government.
On the other hand, it is entirely consistent with Wolfe's revisionist
defense to believe that this interpretation is debatable rather than
inevitable. And it seems to me to be consistent with both positions
to believe that the members of Marshall's Court thought that
conscientious legal interpretation was possible and that they were
engaged in it. And, finally, this last belief is not incompatible with
acknowledging that personal and partisan considerations may have
had a part to play in how those justices conceived and evaluated the
complicated issues before them.
This degree of overlap is rather striking, but is by no means
limited to Wolfe's particular reply to the realist critique. Much of
the same can be said of Robert Lowry Clinton's impressive, but
sometimes elusive, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review,36
which appeared three years after The Rise of Modern Judicial
Review. 37 Like Wolfe, Clinton depicts modern judicial review as
radically different from what was affirmed by Marbury. Under the
modern practice, the Court lays the statute alongside the
Constitution and, if there is a mismatch, "voids" the legislation.
Under Marbury, according to Clinton, the relevant constitutional
provision is implied into the statute, and any inconsistency means
that the Court cannot enforce both aspects of the statute. 8 Thus,

under the traditional understanding, the statute is simply not
enforced rather than being (in some metaphysical sense) void. This
33. Id. at 99.
34. Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 36-37.
35. WOLFE, supra note 13, at 101-08, 116.
36. CLINTON, supra note 2.
37. WOLFE, supra note 13.
38. CLINTON, supra note 2, at 30.
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means that the statute continues in force for other purposes (outside
the case at hand) and that the Court's judgment is not supreme over
the constitutional judgments of the other branches. Only in this
narrow circumstance of Marbury itself, that is, where a statute
violates constitutional restrictions on the judicial power, is there
judicial supremacy-and then only in the practical sense that such a
statute can never be effective in any way except through judicial
acquiescence.39 Furthermore, Clinton reads Marbury as being
restricted to cases of clear contradiction under the same sort of
"objective" interpretive standards that Wolfe describes.4 ° Modern
judicial review, in contrast, involves unmoored judicial
"policymaking."'"
Since modern judicial review is so much wider, more
authoritative, and less constrained than what Marbury
contemplated, Clinton, like Wolfe, rejects the idea that the modern
practice can be traced back to that case. Instead, he argues that the
contemporary judicial role grew out of a mythical conception of the
Court's power. This myth was originally based on an intellectual
mistake, a misreading of Marbury first put forward late in the
nineteenth century.42 Borne along by such cultural and institutional
influences as the self-interest of lawyers and the political
aspirations of the legal academy,' this mistake achieved the status
of orthodoxy in the writings of twentieth century realists like Van
Alstyne.'" As Clinton states the orthodoxy, "since judicial review
originated from a coup d'etat, engineered for political purposes,
Marbury is [thought to be] the primary antecedent for judicial
policymaking in the modern era. '
Notwithstanding the rhetorical force in the word "myth,"
Clinton begins his defense of Marbury by defining his objective
modestly: "to provide a more balanced view of the case."'" And
indeed, his arguments, like Wolfe's, are more a complement to, than
a displacement of, the realist critique. For example, against the
realists' point that the Court should not have reached the merits of
the case if it had no jurisdiction and that it had political reasons for
commenting on the merits as it did, Clinton argues that the Court
"might" have felt constrained to explain its refusal to employ
jurisdiction where it ordinarily could exercise discretion and where
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

18.
24.
192.
179-81.
211.
87.
219.
88.
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it would be functioning as a trial court to determine the rights of the
parties.4 7 This argument does not even claim to be legally conclusive
and can easily coexist with political explanations. Thus, Clinton
himself goes on to say that it would be "understandable" for the
Court to have been "chagrined" at the Secretary of State's "brazen"
resistance to the judiciary.8 Similarly, Clinton's refutation of the
claim that the Judiciary Act could have been construed to provide
for appellate mandamus jurisdiction concludes by calling this claim
"questionable" and by insisting only that the Court's construction
was not a "gross abuse of judicial authority." 9
Finally, Clinton's defense of Marbury's argument for judicial
review consists largely in emphasizing those aspects of the opinion
that imply a narrow version of the power. He does not deny the
realists' point that it is part of the legislative function to interpret
the Constitution. Nor, except in the circumstance where the
provision is addressed to the Court itself, does he deny that it would
not be logically inconsistent with the supremacy of the document for
a court to accept legislative interpretations. 0 And in that narrow
circumstance, Clinton's contrary conclusion rests on his conception
of the principle of separation of powers more than on the arguments
made in Marbury.
A third recent defense of Marbury is William E. Nelson's
Marbury v. Madison: The Origins and Legacy of Judicial Review,"
published in 2000. Nelson, like other revisionists, argues that
Marbury can be justified as legally sound, "2 and that there is a sharp
contrast between modern judicial review and what was
contemplated by Justice Marshall's decision.53 Modern review,
according to Nelson, involves the Court asserting a supreme
authority to settle contested policy disputes and is aimed primarily54
at protecting certain minority interests from majoritarian power.
In contrast, Marbury was a legal, not a political, decision. Its rules
of interpretation were based in the deeply imbedded notion that the
arena of law consisted of unchanging, customary principles that
enjoyed universal support and existed, of course, independently of
judges' preferences. Nelson argues that Marbury's analysis of the
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at 88-89.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 98-99.
51. WILLIAM E. NELSON,

JUDICIAL REVIEW (2000).

52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

118-19.
119.
95-103.
63-67.
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right to the commission fell within this legal domain and that the
decision carefully avoided the arena of political disagreement and
conflict by declaring the Judiciary Act unconstitutional, thus
eliminating any need for enforcing a decree against the Republican
administration.5 6
According to Nelson, the traditional version of judicial review
depended partly on the possibility of strategies for avoiding
confrontation, but even more fundamentally, on the existence of a
consensus concerning fixed principles of law.57 It follows that the
modem version of judicial review grew not from Marbury but from a
breakdown of the social and intellectual homogeneity that allowed
for that consensus.8 Because that homogeneity no longer exists and
because he is sympathetic to the Court's campaigns on behalf of
various minority interests, Nelson, unlike Wolfe and Clinton, does
not present the legalistic Marbury as a continuing reproach to
modem practices. Instead, he suggests that modem America must
make an informed choice between fidelity to the traditional model
and contemporary egalitarian goals. 9
The suggestion that it is necessary to choose between a legally
justified Marbury and modem judicial practices might seem to imply
that Nelson's defense of the decision is inconsistent with, rather
than complementary to, the realist critique. But even more plainly
than is the case with Wolfe and Clinton's revisionist defenses, this is
not true. Indeed, Nelson's defense, in significant measure, is the
realist critique. Thus, Nelson provides an arresting argument that
Marbury's counsel thought that his action was pursuant to the
Court's appellate jurisdiction because at the time the Court's direct
review of an administrative action could have "plausibly" been
viewed as a kind of appeal from the executive branch decisionwhich, according to Nelson, would have involved the Court in a less
constrained form of oversight than original jurisdiction. 60 So, the
argument goes, Marshall "had to" construe the Judiciary Act to
create original jurisdiction in order to avoid involving the Court in
the politics of unconstrained "review" of executive branch decisionmaking.6' In other words, the Marbury Court ignored a plain
reading of the Judiciary Act so that it could exercise the kind of
review over executive officials that it thought appropriate.

56. Id. at 67.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id. at 83, 92.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 62.
Id.
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Having tortured the Judiciary Act, however, the Court was still
faced with the prospect of political confrontation because in the
exercise of even the legalistic form of review available under original
jurisdiction, the Court would have had to order the Secretary of
State to deliver the commissions. So, as Nelson puts it again,
"Marshall had to find a way to deny Marbury the writ of mandamus
.... ,,62 Or, to put it more critically, the Marbury Court construed
Article III as it did-not for (or, more charitably, not only for) the
stated reason of giving full meaning to the words "in all other
cases"-but for an unstated purpose of avoiding a political
confrontation with the executive branch. Nelson depicts this sort of
strategic decision-making as enforcing the fixed legal principle that
courts should avoid politics.63 But it is indistinguishable from the
modern realist argument, famously made by Alexander Bickel, that
the Court should sometimes avoid providing otherwise legallyrequired relief in order to protect itself from unseemly
confrontations with the other branches.
Given Nelson's claim that in 1803 the domain of law was
understood to cover only immutable, consensual principles, he is, of
course, committed to defending Marbury's announcement of the
doctrine of judicial review as an example of that sort of principle.
And, indeed, he is forthright in tossing out other types of legalistic
bases for the doctrine: "[A]t no point in the opinion did [Marshall]
invoke the language of natural rights, nor did he rely on precedent
or other prior judicial authority."' Moreover, Nelson does, as one
would expect, point to evidence in the opinion about an effective
consensus on the content of the Constitution.3 He notes that the
idea of judicial review was "not new" with Marbury-Hamilton and
others had argued for the doctrine. But in the end, he has to
acknowledge that "the propriety of exercising the power of judicial
review was not without doubt prior to Marbury v. Madison." '
So, if judicial review was not a fixed, consensual principle, how
was its announcement justified under Nelson's account of the
framers' understanding of lawfulness? Nelson's main answer is that
•"the Chief Justice gave adequate reassurance that ... [in exercising
the power] the Court would consider only legal and not political
issues., 67 This reply is, I think, fully compatible with-indeed, it is
another way of stating-the realists' argument that Marshall

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

63 (emphasis added).
70.
63.
64.
67.
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established the power of judicial review in circumstances where the
self-restraint of the judiciary would seem most apparent. This can
seem a good-faith appeal to fixed principle for those who, like
Nelson, find the reassurance convincing, but it can seem to be a
strategic power grab for those who do not. Marbury, of course, has
provoked both types of reactions, and both characterizations hold
some truth.
The writings of the three revisionists discussed so far form a
kind of curve. Wolfe and Clinton both conceive of Marbury as an
embodiment of traditional legal methods, but they begin to bend this
line by describing those methods in terms that are, in considerable
measure, compatible with modem realist understandings. Nelson
bends the line further away from a purely legalistic defense by
describing the traditional legal method embodied in Marbury as the
articulation of fixed principles that gain their authority from social
consensus. With the publication in the Harvard Law Review of
Larry D. Kramer's Forward on the 2000 term, the revisionist line
loops all the way back to the realist critique. 8 In Forward: We the
Court, Kramer argues that Marbury is justified precisely because it
did not conceive of constitutional law as normal law. Instead, it
conceived of constitutional law as fundamentally political, as
expressing the sovereign will of the people. 69 According to Kramer,
then, the judicial role established by Marbury accurately reflected
existing understandings and consisted in no more than
subordinating the Court's decisions to the will of the people in the
same way that the decisions of the other branches were subordinate
to that supreme will.7" Marbury, that is, can be justified, but only if
formal conceptualizations of law are supplemented. What the
realists took to be the basis of critique, Kramer asserts as the
beginning of justification.7
Accordingly, Kramer argues that Marbury is limited by the
understanding that judicial interpretations of the Constitution are
ultimately subordinate to political expressions of the will of the
people.72 Until modem times, this understanding has been carried
forward by various doctrines and devices, like the deferential
rationality standard or the political question doctrine, that have
allowed for shared interpretative authority at least in defined areas.
Like the other revisionists, Kramer thinks that modem judicial
review is different from the practices that Marbury set in motion

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Larry D. Kramer, Forward:We the Court, 115 HARv. L. REV. 4 (2001).
Id. at 87-89.
See id.
See id. at 89-90.
Id. at 89.
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and is traceable to factors largely extrinsic to that decision.7 3 For
him, however, modern judicial review does not consist of lawless
policymaking or egalitarianism, but of a legal fundamentalism that
conceives of all constitutional questions-from the reach of
Congress' commerce power to how the 2000 Florida vote count
should be tallied-as ordinary questions of law and thus as
intrinsically and solely within the province of judges.74 This judicial
"sovereignty" over constitutional issues arose gradually and for
complex historical reasons, including popular familiarization with
judicial review, the growth of political parties, and anxiety over
factionism.75
Since, at its core, the realist critique of Marbury simply denies
that there is any logical necessity for judicial-as opposed to
political--enforcement of constitutional limitations, the question
about Kramer's argument for shared interpretive authority is not
whether it is compatible with realist arguments, but whether it is
compatible with the other revisionist defenses. True, like other
revisionists, Kramer claims that Marbury was justified if taken to
establish a limited authority over constitutional issues and that
modem practices are incompatible with that original justification."
But Wolfe, Clinton, and Nelson all insist that the role envisioned by
Marbury was a traditionally legal one, while Kramer argues that
the role established in Marbury was special to constitutional 77issues
and different from the resolution of ordinary questions of law.
It is important to note, however, that while Kramer does claim
that constitutional issues are not ordinary legal issues, he does not
necessarily claim that courts should employ extra-legal methods or
criteria in resolving them. Instead, his argument seems to be that
ordinary legal analysis is useful to some extent and as to some kinds
of constitutional issues. At least, those are the methods Kramer
says the Court employed in the years immediately following
Marbury, and those are the methods that he asserts brought a
degree of popular acceptance for judicial review during that period."
Thus, while Kramer's defense is fully compatible with the realist
critique, its major elements are supplemental to, rather than
inconsistent with, the defenses mounted by the other revisionists.
Thus far, I have tried to indicate the extent to which the realist
critique and the revisionist defense are (despite varying emphases

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See id. at 12-15, 100-02.
Id. at 13-15, 99-100.
See id. at 100-10.
See id. at 14.
See generally id.
Id. at 100.
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and combative rhetoric) complementary accounts of Marbury v.
Madison. 9 These accounts tell us that the decision, as a whole, was
simultaneously political and legal and that some limited form of
judicial review is probably the best, though not the only, possible
interpretation of the Constitution. To the extent that Marbury
combined political realism and legal formalism in this way, the
hypothesis that emerges is that the modem practice of judicial
review is traceable, in part, to this combination. If both aspects of
the opinion are taken into account, it is possible to consider
something that, in isolation, the critique and the defense each tends
to pass over-that is, how interaction between realism and legalism
may have helped to create contemporary excesses.
IV.

THE INTERACTION BETWEEN REALISM AND LEGALISM

In order to have a satisfactory account of the relationship
between Marbury and the modem practice of judicial review, it is
necessary to acknowledge not only the complexity of the decision but
also the complexity of modem judicial behavior. Each of the writers
considered here works from a simplified description of that behavior.
Except for Kramer, both realists and revisionists depict
contemporary judicial review as essentially political (in some sense).
By criticizing recent constitutional decisions as excessively
legalistic, Kramer demonstrates the limitations of this description.
However, his criticism, while convincing as a supplement, is itself
partial. To get a fuller picture of causation, it is necessary to admit
that modem judicial review is, like Marbury, a complex mixture of
both the political and the legalistic.
Recall that, according to Kramer, modem judicial review is
characterized not merely by judicial claims of supremacy in
interpreting the Constitution, but of what he calls "sovereignty." A
79. In noting areas of overlap, I do not mean to suggest that the two
positions are in all respects consistent.
Some traditionalists, perhaps
Christopher Wolfe, believe that certain clauses are sufficiently specific that
conclusive interpretation is possible, while some realists, perhaps Van Alstyne,
believe that the nature of language is such that some indeterminacy is present
even if language is highly specific. The two positions might also differ on the
question, whether it is ever possible for the human mind to separate its
assessment of constitutional considerations from personal or political
commitments. Even assuming areas of real disagreement, the accounts have
much in common. (In the two instances mentioned, that would include
recognition that many important constitutional issues are not susceptible to
conclusive resolution and that both legal and political considerations are often
simultaneously present.) In any event, even ideas that can be shown to be
ultimately inconsistent can be-and, of course, often are-held at the same time
and, thus, may be interacting in the minds of modern judges.
80. Kramer, supra note 68, at 130-57.
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claim of sovereignty differs from a claim to supremacy in that, as
long as the Court has the final word, supremacy permits nonjudicial interpretations-and courts even sometimes defer to themat least as to selected areas of constitutional law. Sovereignty, in
contrast, means that the Court tends to see all interpretations of the
Constitution done outside the courts as illegitimate.
Kramer
attributes the current regime of judicial sovereignty to what he
provocatively terms "legal fundamentalism."8 A fundamentalist is
someone who has lost sight of the fact that constitutional issues are
not ordinary questions of law. A pure fundamentalist would be
someone who believed that all constitutional issues are entirely
legal.
To the extent that modern justices approach pure
fundamentalism, they believe that the only institution that can
legitimately interpret any part of the Constitution is the judiciary
because only judges should resolve ordinary questions of law.
This is an arresting diagnosis. Without question, it is partly
true. Moreover, the word "fundamentalism" connotes unthinking
conservatism and, thus, for many academics it will dovetail nicely
with Kramer's main object of criticism, the Rehnquist Court and
decisions like Bush v. Gore. 2 Indeed, the word very effectively
distances Kramer from some of the other, more conservative,
revisionists because it colorfully emphasizes the fact that their
formalistic defenses of Marbury may have contributed to the very
fundamentalism that has created the judicial hubris that they decry.
As intellectually arresting and politically skillful as it is,
Kramer's diagnosis gains much of its plausibility because his
description of modem judicial review is so narrow. Legalistic
fundamentalism does not account for many of the characteristics of
modem uses of judicial power, including those that the other
revisionists criticize, and it does not even provide a full explanation
for judicial sovereignty.
Consider, first of all, one of the most widely noted aspects of
modern constitutional interpretation-its astonishing range. The
modern Court not only sees most constitutional issues as legal, it
also sees most social issues as constitutional. What accounts for the
constitutionalizing of so many issues-from voting rights to gay
rights to abortion rights? Fundamentalism does not seem to be an
explanation. It is, of course, logically possible for all constitutional
issues to be entirely legal but, nevertheless, for most policy disputes
to lie outside the ambit of constitutional law.
Moreover, a
fundamentalist might well recognize that legalism is an inadequate
or dangerous way to resolve the complicated social issues that do lie
81. Id. at 129-30, 153, 169.
82. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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outside those boundaries. One might have expected, therefore, that
despite their constitutional fundamentalism, at least some
justices-and perhaps all of them-should be attempting to
interpret the document to apply only to those issues that its terms
require, and then, only with that degree of detail that can be
compellingly justified.
So, to account for modem practices, Kramer's diagnosis requires
the assumption that a working majority of the justices believes that
the terms of the Constitution apply to almost all issues of public
policy-is convinced, that is, that ordinary legalistic methods must
be used to resolve virtually all social issues. Such a belief is
possible, of course, and may in fact be widespread, but it would seem
inconsistent with the degree of institutional hubris that
accompanies the Court's inclination to treat a wide range of issues
as constitutional issues. Indeed, unless the justices not only
believed that ordinary legal methods must be used to resolve
constitutional questions, but also harbored the unlikely belief that
those methods constitute a superior way to decide almost any moral
or political question, they presumably would perform their tasks
reluctantly, perhaps even sorrowfully. Reluctant fundamentalist
justices would understand and even share public frustration over
judicial resolution of policy issues. They would not, therefore, be
likely to display the visceral and intense disapproval of non-judicial
efforts at interpretation that is common today. Indeed, while
fundamentalists might feel it their duty to monopolize constitutional
determinations, at least some might sympathize with and respect
those in the political arena who tried to influence the Court's
decisions.
Finally, "fundamentalism" in Kramer's sense of the word should
have produced a prosaic, if stiff, view of the Court's methods and
role. After all, the reason a fundamentalist does not think that
people in the political arena have any business doing constitutional
interpretation is because that task is thought to involve ordinary
legal issues. Why, then, does the modern Court utilize so many
nontraditional forms of analysis?
What accounts for the
pervasiveness of instrumental calculation, interest balancing, and
various forms of empiricism? Why has the fundamentalism that has
gripped the modern Court led to very few unequivocal principles and
to no absolutes at all? And why are justices who see constitutional
interpretation as a form of ordinary legal work so drawn to grand
conceptualizations of the role of the Court?
How has
fundamentalism led to the idea that it is the Court's business to
discover the fundamental principles inherent in our political
traditions, or to protect minority interests, or to prevent social
disintegration?
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In short, while Kramer demonstrates that some of the other
revisionists are missing something when they depict modem
excesses as arising from the absence of traditional legalism, he
himself is missing something when he depicts those excesses as
arising almost entirely from the presence of legalism.
To
understand contemporary practices, it is necessary to imagine the
mind of a judge who is simultaneously a legalist and a realist, that
is, a mind that conceives law and politics to be different but not
separable and believes that an interpretation can be right while not
conclusive. Such a mind, I submit, is not some bizarre concoction,
but is a fairly accurate depiction of the way justices in the modern
era approach constitutional interpretation.
Indeed, it is the
dominant American view of constitutional interpretation, the
essentials of which are shared, as I have tried to show elsewhere, by
theorists as disparate as Robert Bork and Ronald Dworkin"' and, as
I have tried to demonstrate in this Article, Christopher Wolfe and
William Van Alstyne.
Most jurists today do not believe that in interpreting the
Constitution they are simply imposing their own personal or
political agenda. Unless their long and arduous explanations are set
aside as entirely dishonest, justices, for instance, believe that they
are offering the best interpretations of the Constitution based on
rigorous interpretive criteria. But, unless they are assumed to be
ignorant of basic modern jurisprudence, they also suspect that it is
impossible to formulate or apply these criteria independently of
individual character or political philosophy. Constitutional law,
that is, is thought not only to subsume the political, but also to
transcend it.
Paradoxically, it is because constitutional interpretation is
viewed as partly but inevitably political, that the modern judicial
mind resists the conclusion that many issues are not appropriate for
resolution in the courts. That conclusion must be resisted because if
the presence of a practical or political component were to disqualify
the judiciary, it would seem to follow that all constitutional issues
are out of bounds.8
Moreover, as constitutional decisions
accumulate, judges, of course, become more and more accustomed to
resolving issues that might have once seemed political and, thus, the
sense that the Constitution covers only a finite range of issues
further recedes, and so does any sense of regret for being under the
obligation to decide complex legislative or executive matters. The
modem judge not only is accustomed to making such decisions, but
83. See Robert F. Nagel, Meeting the Enemy, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 633 (1990).
84. For an explicit argument to this effect, see Martin H. Redish, Judicial
Review and the "PoliticalQuestion," 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1031 (1985).
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also knows that, since legal and practical criteria are inseparable,
many of the same intellectual resources available in the political
arena are also available to the judge. Judges down through the ages
have been doing law, and in the process they must have also been
doing some legislating too. The realistic side of the modern judge's
mind unapologetically extracts these policymaking strands and uses
them overtly and with increasing confidence. Motivations behind
political movements are forthrightly assessed, empirical data is
assessed, and the instrumental efficacy of various measures is
evaluated.
Modem judges, however, do not simply appropriate these
realistic methods; they recast them to suit judicial tastes and habits
and institutional requirements. (Politics and law, remember, are
inevitably mixed.) Thus, for example, political motivation is treated,
not as an exceedingly complex empirical matter, but as a deductive
proposition likely to yield the sort of singular conclusion that can
justify a case outcome." Similarly, empirical data that comes in
highly systematic form with expert credentials is favored over the
messier kinds of data that arise out of human experience and
interaction. And instrumental efficacy is assessed on the possibly
conclusive basis of objectives that pre-existed the policy rather than
on the experimental and never-final basis of objectives discovered
during policy implementation.& These refinements, being congenial
to the relatively cerebral judge, only incline the justices to develop
less respect for political decision-makers even as they increasingly
invade their territory. As the range of constitutional issues widens,
judges become more self-assured and see less reason to share
interpretive authority.
This dismissiveness grows into outright intolerance (here is
Kramer's point) because, at the same time as modem judges are
increasingly convinced that courts can resolve practical problems,
they are also convinced that there is a distinctly legal component to
constitutional issues and they know that they have special expertise
on that aspect. The formalistic frame of mind associated with this
legal side imparts much besides a sense of expertise and
entitlement. While the realist side of the modern judge's mind
knows that the Court is deciding highly significant and controversial
matters of morality, the formalistic side reassuringly recasts the
issue into the manageable form of a single case, and one that must
be decided at that. A duty to decide even a single case of great
political significance, of course, might itself be daunting, but the
85. For an extreme example, see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
86. See ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY
CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 106-55 (1989).
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Court's policymaking methodology (folded into complex legalistic
doctrines), provides powerful reassurance partly because decisions,
while final and authoritative, are almost never determinative. If the
data changes or if a more rational statutory strategy is utilized or if
one of the interests in the balance should change, the political
branches might well be permitted to pursue their policies.
Even if controversial decisions are reassuringly limited, modern
judges know that a particular interpretation is not inevitable. This
might be expected to generate some pressure for modesty, but
modern judges also know that such decisions are good-faith
attempts to arrive at the best available interpretation. Thus,
modern judging is characterized by a sense of deep vulnerability (no
interpretation can be conclusive) that coexists with a sense of great
conviction (this is the best interpretation). Judges know that they
cannot in the end overcome disagreement at the same moment that
they know their interpretation to be the best one possible.
Disagreement, under these circumstances, is a source of profound
frustration and anger.
As the judiciary progressively displaces legislative and
executive authority and, in the process, incorporates policymaking
methods into its own decision-making, the fundamentalist claim
that only courts can be trusted with ordinary legal issues becomes
less and less plausible as a justification for the judiciary's role.
Moreover, even as they incorporate the methods of political decision
makers, judges, as I have explained, exhibit increasing intolerance
and even arrogance towards political disagreement. Accordingly,
the courts must develop new and grander ways to distinguish
themselves from political institutions. Or, to put it another way, the
purpose of ordinary law must be elevated. It may be, for instance,
that in enforcing text-based rules the Court is also protecting
abstract principles of democratic theory. Or, it may be that in the
process of resolving cases the Court is also teaching fundamental
constitutional values or even preventing political disintegration. In
any event, as the conceptualization of the Court's role gets fancier,
perceived threats to its authority seem not merely frustrating or
even infuriating, but dangerous. The modern drive for judicial
monopolization, then, derives not from legal fundamentalism but
from an inflated sense of institutional mission. And that sense of
mission grew gradually from the interaction between realism and
formalism.
V.

CONCLUSION

The revisionist defenders of Marbury are surely right that the
causes of modern judicial review must be sought, not in that
decision alone, but in complex historical, institutional, and social
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considerations. While the realist critics may well be wrong in their
contrasting assessment of the importance of Marbury, their claims
do raise a question that the revisionists are in danger of overlooking:
Why, at least in recent decades, when the judicial power has
reached its zenith, has Marbury exercised such a mystic hold on the
imagination of important segments of the American people? Or, to
put the question differently: Is there something about Marbury that
might tell us something about American fascination with, and
dependence on, judicial power and, thus, something about the
cultural roots of modem judicial behavior?
If the dispute between realists and revisionists about Marbury
is deflated and their positions are recognized to be overlapping and
complementary, it is possible to see why Chief Justice Marshall's
decision has come to stand as the intellectual emblem of judicial
supremacy over constitutional issues. The reason is that Marbury
contains some of the same raw ingredients that have worked within
the American political culture to produce the world's most powerful
judiciary. It seamlessly combines legalism and political realism, as
does our society's dominant view of law and of judging. The
elements within this combination interact in such a way as to make
it difficult to confine the reach of constitutional law, or to recognize
as respectable any decision-making method different from that used
by the judiciary, or, ultimately, to tolerate contention over the
meaning of the Constitution.

